China’s development assistance model: Is it timely for Africa?

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OPINION

By Arthur Atuha

Foreign aid, policy interventions, and development programs have long influenced social behaviour change in Africa. Historically, Western nations, particularly the US, have played a dominant role in shaping Africa’s social development through direct aid, health initiatives, and education programs, with approximately $90–$100b in total assistance from the State Department.

Nearly 20% of this funding has been targeted towards social behaviour change (e.g., health practices, gender norms, governance participation) in the past decade. However, the current US President Donald Trump’s administration has significantly reduced foreign aid, impacting NGOs like Save the Children, CARE International, and others that rely on American funding.

In contrast, China has taken a different approach, focusing on infrastructure development as a mechanism for economic growth, which indirectly influences social behaviour. The People’s Republic of China has wired over $150b in infrastructure loans to Africa (2013-2023). Rather than attaching conditional aid, China’s strategy revolves around trade, loans, and large-scale projects such as roads, railways, and industrial parks. But does this model effectively drive social behaviour change in Africa?

In January 2025, under the current Trump administration, the US slashed foreign aid, including contributions to global health initiatives like PEPFAR, the Global Fund and humanitarian organisations.

The "America First" policy prioritised domestic spending, leaving African NGOs scrambling for alternative funding. Despite the notable dissatisfactions with such foreign policies both being direct (job loss) and indirect such as Reduced vaccination programs in rural Uganda (Moroto), cuts in malnutrition interventions in Kenya and Somalia as well as fewer educational initiatives for girls in West Africa; This direction has greatly impacted on behavioral Consequences such as increased Dependency on Local Solutions and a Shift in Public Perception no wonder the emerging distrust towards Western aid models grew, with some Africans questioning the sustainability of donor-dependent programs that often come with governance or policy conditions.

China’s engagement in Africa is primarily economic. China’s infrastructure-driven model is reshaping Africa’s socio-economic landscape, albeit indirectly. During the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2021 hosted in Dakar, Senegal, President Xi Jinping of China pledged to boost Chinese imports of African products, Chinese participation in African poverty reduction programmes, a green development programme, a capacity building programme and a digital innovation programme, drives which indirectly are people eccentric.

While Trump’s aid cuts weakened traditional NGOs, China’s investments are seen to offer an alternative as one that prioritises economic transformation over direct behaviour change programs. China’s infrastructure projects, such as Uganda’s Kampala-Entebbe Expressway and Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway, have subtly reshaped social dynamics. Improved transportation networks, for instance, have reduced rural isolation, enabling faster access to healthcare and markets, thus altering trade behaviours and reducing reliance on subsistence farming, a sign of economic mobility.

Investment in energy projects like the Karuma Dam in Uganda and solar farms in Ethiopia. Take a snippet at Ethiopia, where the government recently awarded three (3) Chinese firms 12 solar energy projects distributed across the country and are estimated to cost $10.3m built in the states of Oromia, Amhara, Somali, Tigray, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gumuz and Gambella regions. These are meant to benefit more than 67,700 rural homes upon completion.

Additionally, in Ethiopia, the Chinese have built industrial zones, which have created jobs for women, challenging traditional gender roles. While these changes are not explicitly designed as behaviour change interventions, they have nonetheless influenced how people live, work, and access services.      

Critics continue to argue that China’s model has downsides, including debt concerns and a lack of direct investment in social sectors. This could be true, however, looking at the “Bigger Picture”, the cost of using Chinese finance tends to decrease insignificantly with time, with the benefits outgrowing visibility. Notwithstanding, some African countries have gone ahead to leverage their negotiation power to overcome such downsides. For example, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Ali, visited Beijing and negotiated the cancellation of accumulated interest from her debts, estimated at between $12b and $20b.

Therefore, China’s infrastructure-first approach offers a compelling alternative to the traditional aid framework. The question remains: Can economic transformation alone drive lasting social behaviour change, or must it be paired with targeted health and education initiatives? The answer then likely lies in a hybrid model, perhaps one that leverages Chinese investment for growth while ensuring complementary social policies. As Africa navigates this evolving landscape, the future of development may depend on balancing infrastructure-driven progress with the nuanced needs of its people.

The writer is a Research fellow at the Development Watch Centre