DRC: Rwanda's diplomacy and M23's military prowess

By Simon Mulongo

The high-stakes meeting between Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame and DR Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi in Qatar is more than just another diplomatic effort to resolve the escalating conflict in eastern DR Congo. 

It reflects a wider geopolitical recalibration where battlefield supremacy, shifting alliances and increasing international pressure are dictating the future of the Great Lakes region. 

As Rwanda and the M23 consolidate their gains on the ground, Kinshasa is struggling to craft an effective military or diplomatic response.

The reliance on Qatari mediation further exposes the failure of “African solutions to African problems” as regional mechanisms remain sidelined, unable to shape the outcome of the conflict. 

The question remains: Is this meeting a genuine path to peace or another tactical pause designed to buy time for the next phase of conflict? Kagame’s strategy in Qatar reflects Rwanda’s tactical diplomacy — negotiating from strength while ensuring concessions remain superficial.

Rwanda wields diplomacy as a strategic tool to sustain dominance and operational flexibility. 

The 2002 Pretoria Agreement led to Rwanda’s troop withdrawal, yet the persistent Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda threat justified Kigali’s continued influence. 

Similarly, the 2013 Kampala Talks left M23’s grievances unresolved, enabling its resurgence and reinforcing Rwanda’s leverage. In Qatar, might Rwanda have adhered to the same doctrine — committing not to relinquish power but to enhance its strategic influence in eastern DR Congo? 

Now, this year, the meeting in Qatar follows this same doctrine. With M23 in its strongest military position in a decade, Kagame has entered negotiations not out of desperation, but to consolidate gains and mitigate growing diplomatic pressure from the West. 

By controlling the timing and conditions of engagement, Kigali ensures that any settlement aligns with its long-term strategic objectives.

M23’s operational supremacy in eastern DR Congo exposes the systemic failures of Kinshasa’s doctrinally conventional warfighting approach. With 5,000-7,500 battle-hardened combatants, M23 executes high-tempo, asymmetric warfare, exploiting Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (FARDC) structurally fragmented and politically encumbered command apparatus.

Simon Mulongo

Unlike FARDC’s static positional defences, M23 employs fluid maneuver warfare, synchronised multi-vector offensives and rapid force projection — tactics reminiscent of Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front during its 1990-1994 insurgency. 

Intelligence-driven targeting and adaptive operational tempo allow M23 to dictate battlespace conditions, rendering numerically superior adversaries tactically inert and strategically immaterial. 

By establishing dominance over the Goma-Rutshuru corridor, M23 has decisively impaired Kinshasa’s ability to project military power in the region. 

FARDC’s reliance on a fragmented and ineffectual Southern African Development Community contingent has starkly exposed Kinshasa’s operational vulnerabilities. 

The theater is now dictated by M23’s strategic maneuvers, leaving Kinshasa in a reactive posture, adrift and bereft of coherent strategic direction in an increasingly hostile landscape.

Despite Rwanda’s battlefield and diplomatic prowess, Kagame faces escalating international headwinds. The defection of senior Rwandan diplomats to Europe, particularly Belgium, signals fractures within Kigali’s foreign service, with insiders seeking asylum rather than returning home. 

These defections, including high-level officials privy to state secrets, hint at internal dissent and strategic uncertainty. Belgium’s refuge for fleeing envoys, following Kigali’s diplomatic rupture, marks a rare Western rebuke. Meanwhile, EU sanctions on Rwandan officials tied to M23 may further constrain Kagame’s geopolitical manoeuvrability, intensifying his diplomatic recalibration. 

Faced with increasing Western scrutiny, Rwanda’s pivot to Qatar is a strategic recalibration. Doha, which has cultivated economic and political ties with Kigali in recent years, offers Rwanda a new diplomatic partner insulated from Western pressure. 

Rwanda’s deepening relationship with Qatar, particularly in aviation and infrastructure, provides Kagame with alternative economic and political backing as relations with Europe and the US become more strained. 

The Qatar mediation may not yield an immediate resolution, but it represents a critical juncture for all involved. Three key outcomes could shape the future landscape. 

First, Kagame might advocate for M23’s inclusion in peace talks, thereby granting it legitimacy while preserving its military strength. Second, Tshisekedi’s dependence on Qatari mediation signifies a diminishing faith in African-led resolutions; Qatar’s success could redefine diplomacy in the Great Lakes region. 

Lastly, if talks fail, Rwanda may intensify M23’s military actions, pushing Kinshasa into reckless decisions and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. In sum, the Qatar talks emphasise a fundamental truth: War is a continuation of politics by other means.

Kagame, a strategist, understands the need to convert battlefield successes into diplomatic gains. In contrast, Tshisekedi appears reactive, relying on external solutions while the crisis spirals beyond his grasp. 

The military dominance of M23, Rwanda’s diplomatic recalibration, and Kinshasa’s waning strategy suggest an ongoing conflict where military realities shape political trajectories.

The outcome of Qatar’s mediation will determine if a lasting settlement emerges or if the battlefield merely resets for the next round. 

This war in eastern DR Congo has evolved beyond local confines into a regional chessboard, where mastery of both war and diplomacy is essential for resolution.

The writer is a governance and security consultant at EMANS Frontiers Ltd.